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TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE "DIMINISHED
CAPACITIES OF THE RETARDED": ARE
CAPITAL JURORS UP TO THE TASK?
Maria Sandys,* Adam Trahan** & Heather Pruss***
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court extended its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence to preclude individuals who are mentally retarded from
being sentenced to death.' Relying on an "evolving standards of de-
cency" analysis, the Court concluded, in Atkins v. Virginia, that there
was "no reason to disagree with the judgment of the legislatures that
have recently addressed the matter and concluded that death is not a
suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal."' 2 Unlike previ-
ous analyses based on evolving standards of decency, the majority de-
voted little attention to the outcomes of actual sentencing juries. As
then Chief Justice Rehnquist remarked in his dissent, "[i]n reaching its
conclusion today, the Court does not take notice of the fact that
neither petitioner nor his amici have adduced any comprehensive sta-
tistics that would conclusively prove (or disprove) whether juries rou-
tinely consider death a disproportionate punishment for mentally
retarded offenders like petitioner."'3 Similarly, Justice Scalia's dissent
echoed the lack of information regarding actual sentencing juries:
The Court's analysis rests on two fundamental assumptions: (1)
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive punishments, and
(2) that sentencing juries or judges are unable to account properly
for the "diminished capacities" of the retarded .... The second as-
sumption-inability of judges or juries to take proper account of
mental retardation-is not only unsubstantiated, but contradicts the
immemorial belief, here and in England, that they play an indispen-
sable role in such matters .. .4
* Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, Indiana University.
** Doctoral Student, Department of Criminal Justice, Indiana University.
* Doctoral Student, Department of Criminal Justice, Indiana University.
1. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
2. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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Drawing on data collected by the Capital Jury Project (CJP), 5 this
Article examines how actual capital jurors respond to evidence of
mental retardation. In so doing, it not only addresses the concerns of
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, but also speaks to the ways in which
attorneys representing defendants with mental retardation post-At-
kins can expect triers of fact to respond.
Part II of this Article examines Indiana's handling of seven capital
cases in which the defendant alleged mental retardation. 6 Next, Part
III compares public opinion data regarding death penalty support with
data collected from Florida venirepersons. 7 Part IV details the CJP
and its results. 8 Finally, Part V concludes that jurors are often ill-
equipped to properly account for the "diminished capacities" of de-
fendants with mental retardation. 9
II. IMPACT ON THE SYSTEM
The World Health Organization estimates the worldwide preva-
lence of mental retardation at 1% to 3%.10 Although the number of
capital defendants with mental retardation is unknown, some research
suggests that persons who are mentally retarded are overrepresented
in the criminal justice system. 1 In turn, this suggests that they are
overrepresented among capital defendants. Current estimates of the
number of persons with mental retardation on death row range from
12% to 20% of the population.12
Indiana provides some insight into how triers of fact handle evi-
dence of mental retardation in capital trials. In 1994, Indiana passed a
law that exempts persons with mental retardation from being sen-
tenced to death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. 13
5. See infra note 46.
6. See infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 23-45 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
10. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2001: MENTAL HEALTH: NEW
UNDERSTANDING, NEW HOPE 35 (2001), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2001/en/whr01_en.
pdf.
11. John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants with Mental Retar-
dation in the Criminal Justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL RETAR-
DATION: DEFENDANTS AND VICTIMS 55, 62 (Ronald W. Conley et al. eds., 1992).
12. Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American Bar
Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a
Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 40 (1996); Lyn Entzeroth, Put-
ting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the Development of a National
Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911, 911
(2001).
13. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-6 (LexisNexis 1998).
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Under that law, judges determine defendants' mental status in pretrial
hearings.' 4 Since the passage of the new law, seven capitally charged
defendants have alleged mental retardation pursuant to the statute.15
Trial courts found three of these seven defendants to be mentally re-
tarded and, thus, dismissed the state's death penalty requests. 16 In
two of the seven cases, prosecutors negotiated plea agreements prior
to the trial courts' determinations.' 7 The two remaining cases pro-
ceeded to trial, and the juries decided that death was the appropriate
punishment for each defendant.1 8 In one of those two cases, the trial
court overrode the jury's recommendation and imposed a sentence of
life without parole. The other defendant was sentenced to death, and
his case is currently being appealed.19
While the findings from a single state cannot be generalized to the
nation, Indiana's experience sheds light on the ways in which other
jurisdictions may receive evidence of mental retardation post-Atkins.
First, in contrast to Justice Scalia's expectations,20 the overwhelming
percentage of capital defendants did not allege mental retardation in
response to the Indiana law. Second, most cases with an allegation of
mental retardation resulted in sentences other than death. In three of
seven cases where mental retardation was alleged, judges in Indiana
found that defendants met the legal standard for mental retardation
and, thus, could not be sentenced to death.21 In two additional cases,
the prosecutors were willing to negotiate plea agreements before the
judges had decided on the defendants' mental status.22 Only in two of
the seven was a sentence of death found to be appropriate. Thus, the
fact that juries in both of these cases voted for death suggests that
there are no guarantees that jurors who are presented with evidence
of mental retardation will necessarily spare the defendant's life.
14. § 35-36-9-4.
15. From 1995 through 2006, there were ninety-five death penalty requests filed across Indi-
ana. The Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htmUdeath/row
stats.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
16. Interview with Paula Sites, Assistant Executive Dir., Ind. Pub. Defender Council (Jan. 21,
2008).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353-54 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The mere
pendency of the present case has brought us petitions by death row inmates claiming for the first
time, after multiple habeas petitions, that they are retarded.").
21. See Interview with Paula Sites, supra note 16.
22. See id.
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III. PUBLIC OPINION
As noted in Atkins, state and national polls consistently find that a
majority of the public is opposed to capital punishment for offenders
with mental retardation.23 While polls show that 28% of the public
was generally opposed to capital punishment,24 polls cited in Atkins
found that at least 50%, and frequently more than 70%, of respon-
dents were opposed to the death penalty for offenders with mental
retardation. 25 A 2002 Gallup Poll looking at attitudes toward the
death penalty for selected groups found the least support for defend-
ants with mental retardation.2 6 In particular, while general support
for the death penalty was 72%, only 13.5%27 indicated that they were
in favor of the death penalty for persons with mental retardation. 28 In
comparison, 19% favored the death penalty for offenders who are
mentally ill, 26% were in favor of the death penalty for juvenile of-
fenders, and 67.6% favored the death penalty for female offenders. 2
9
Thus, while there is little difference between general support for the
death penalty and support for the death penalty for female offenders,
there is substantially less support for the other groups of offenders.
This is especially true for those who are mentally retarded, where
there is almost a sixty percentage point drop in support for the death
penalty. 30
Because jurors' opinions may differ from those of the general pub-
lic, researchers have also studied prospective jurors. For instance,
Boots and her coauthors administered a questionnaire to all persons
called for jury duty over the course of three days in Tampa, Florida. 31
While the general pattern of findings was mostly consistent with the
results of the Gallup Poll discussed above, there were notable differ-
ences. For instance, 83.4% of respondents were in favor of capital
23. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (majority opinion).
24. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, a 2006 Gallup poll found 67% in
favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder, 28% opposed, and 5% no opinion.
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., National Polls and Studies, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php
?did=2163#gdp (last visited Jan. 3, 2008).
25. See Atkins, 536 U.S. app. at 336-37 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
26. Jeffrey M. Jones, Slim Majority of Americans Say Death Penalty Applied Fairly, THE GAL-
LUP POLL TUESDAY BRIEFING, May 20, 2002, at 55.
27. This is from a sample of 1,012 individuals surveyed. Id.
28. Id. at 54-55.
29. Id. at 55.
30. Id.
31. Denise Paquette Boots et al., Death Penalty Support for Special Offender Populations of
Legally Convicted Murderers: Juveniles, the Mentally Retarded, and the Mentally Incompetent, 22
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 223, 229-30 (2004) (reporting results of a survey of 697 prospective jurors
during the Winter of 2000).
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punishment. 32 That greater favorability among prospective jurors in
Florida was also apparent for each of the groups of special offenders.
For example, Boots found that 29.1% of respondents supported capi-
tal punishment for "adults who are mentally retarded and are legally
convicted of murder. '33 While 29% support represents a sizeable dif-
ference from the national findings, it also reflects almost a fifty-five
percentage point drop in support of the death penalty generally
among Floridians.34 Thus, while the actual level of support clearly dif-
fers from the Gallup Poll, the pattern of findings is similar.35
Although these surveys reveal general opposition to the idea of sub-
jecting persons who are mentally retarded to the death penalty, the
findings do not reveal how jurors actually respond to evidence that a
defendant is mentally retarded. Understandably, the items employed
in these public opinion polls rely upon general conceptions of mental
retardation and assume that respondents know what the diagnosis
means. Most respondents rely upon their own stereotypes regarding
mental retardation when answering general opinion items. Research
suggests that, although such stereotypes are consistent with represen-
tations and images of retardation perpetuated by the media, they are
wrought with misconceptions. For example, people often falsely be-
lieve that all persons with mental retardation "look retarded," exhibit
childlike behavior, and are easy to detect.36 Although some persons
with mental retardation fit this profile, most do not. This profile more
accurately describes those with severe mental retardation than those
who fall in the "mild" range. The expectation that persons who are
mentally retarded will exhibit characteristics of persons who are se-
verely mentally retarded is problematic, because most defendants who
have mental retardation likely fall in the "mild" range.
32. Id. at 229.
33. Id. at 228.
34. See id. at 229-30.
35. Id. at 228. The study also asked about juveniles (fifteen years old and younger) and
"adults who were legally convicted of murder but who later become mentally incompetent (in
other words, those who do not understand the nature of their punishment any longer and/or are
unable to assist in their own defense)." Id. Regarding juveniles, some 34.9% supported the
death penalty, which is somewhat higher than the 26% found by Gallup. Id. As to adults who
become mentally incompetent, a full 57% of respondents in the Florida study supported capital
punishment for such offenders. Id. Given how different this question was from Gallup's ques-
tion about defendants who are mentally ill, no comparison can be made.
36. James R. Patton & Denis W. Keyes, Death Penalty Issues Following Atkins, 14 EXCEP-
TIONALITY 237, 239-40 (2006). Stereotypes of persons who are mentally retarded often contain
a physical profile similar to someone with Down syndrome. Id.; see also Denis W. Keyes et al.,
Mitigating Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the "Invisible" Client, 22 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 529, 531 (1998).
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The characteristics of mild mental retardation are quite different
from the stereotypes. Persons with mild mental retardation generally
have specific areas of weakness and others of relative strength. 37 Pat-
ton and Keyes list several characteristic features of mild mental retar-
dation that, coupled with the stereotypes that jurors are likely to bring
with them to trial, may result in the mistaken judgment that the defen-
dant is not mentally retarded. 38 For example, people with mild mental
retardation tend to be exceedingly gullible, often acquiesce or "give
in" under stressful situations, are highly suggestible, and frequently
exhibit a desire to please. 39 These features often lead suspects with
mental retardation to falsely confess, which may create the impression
among jurors that they understood their actions and made reasoned
decisions.4 0 Further, persons with mild mental retardation tend to
have poor memory, language problems, and difficulty understanding
abstract legal concepts and ideas.41 Arguably, the most counter-
productive characteristic features of mild mental retardation are cer-
tain affectations and the "cloak of competence. ' 42 The former refers
to the tendency of persons with mild mental retardation to display
inappropriate or unfounded emotional reactions. 43 They may smile,
laugh, or applaud during trial, because they frequently do not under-
stand what is happening. 44 Persons with mild mental retardation often
go to great lengths to conceal their condition and may deny their limi-
tations altogether, thereby resulting in a "cloak of competence. 45
The general public's limited exposure to and experience with
mental retardation often result in the formation of unfounded stereo-
types and misconceptions. When these misconceptions are brought
into the jury box, defendants with mental retardation stand to suffer.
If defendants present evidence that is inconsistent with jurors' precon-
ceived notions about mental retardation, the evidence may be dis-
missed, ignored, or at least misunderstood. The remainder of this
Article explores the ways in which capital jurors respond to evidence
of mental retardation.
37. Patton & Keyes, supra note 36, at 250 ("All professional definitions of mental retardation
stress that relative strengths can coexist with deficits in adaptive behavior, as indicated by the
fact that deficits do not have to be found in all adaptive skill areas.").
38. Id. at 240-41.
39. Id. at 241.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Patton & Keyes, supra note 36, at 241.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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IV. THE CAPITAL JURY PROJECT
The data for this Article come from the CJP, organized as a consor-
tium of law and social science professors and designed to explore capi-
tal jurors' decision making. 46 The CJP utilizes extensive face-to-face
interviews with former capital jurors. The interviews address all as-
pects of the jurors' experiences, from the initial reporting of the crime
in the media to jury selection, the guilt and penalty phases, and, ulti-
mately, post-trial. To date, 1,198 jurors from 353 capital trials in four-
teen states have been interviewed. Within each state, researchers
select approximately equal numbers of cases that result in life and
death sentences. The total number of cases selected for inclusion in
the study within a state has ranged from twenty to thirty. For each
capital case, researchers use a systematic selection procedure to target
four jurors to interview. 47
A. Incidence of Mental Retardation
As noted in Atkins, the execution of persons who are mentally re-
tarded "has become truly unusual. '48 However, according to Keyes,
Edwards, and Perske, at least twenty-nine individuals with mental re-
tardation have been executed in the United States from 1984 through
1997. 49 These twenty-nine represent 8.7% of the total number of per-
sons executed during the same period of time.50 The actual number of
cases in which mental retardation was alleged at trial in the post-
Gregg era is unknown. 5' Although the CJP was not designed to an-
swer this question, its findings indicate the extent to which jurors per-
ceive defendants as mentally retarded. In particular, early on in the
46. For further information on the sampling design and data collection procedures, see Wil-
liam J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings, 70
IND. L.J. 1043 (1995). The grant was funded by the Law and Social Science Program of the
National Science Foundation.
47. See id.
48. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
49. Denis Keyes et al., People With Mental Retardation Are Dying, Legally, 35 MENTAL RE-
TARDATION 59 (1997).
50. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Executions by Year, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php
?scid=8&did=146 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., List of Defendants with
Mental Retardation Executed in the United States, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?
did=1858 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008). This figure is based on reports of executions, by year, on
the Death Penalty Information Center's website, which also includes an updated list of persons
with mental retardation who have been executed. Id. According to the Death Penalty Informa-
tion Center, that number is now forty-four (through 2001), which represents 6.3% of all persons
executed during that same time period. Id.
51. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (finding Georgia's newly written death penalty
statute constitutional and thereby reinstating the death penalty in the United States after an
unspoken four-year moratorium).
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interviews, participants are presented with a battery of items and
asked to indicate the extent to which each one describes the defen-
dant. A total of 1,180 former jurors responded to the item about
mental retardation. Of these jurors, 4.8% said that the term "men-
tally retarded" described the defendant "very well," an additional
11.9% said that it described the defendant "fairly well," 19.9% said
that it described the defendant "not so well," and 63.3% said the term
described the defendant "not at all." Thus, a relatively small percent-
age of jurors believed that the defendant in their case was mentally
retarded. Their perceptions comport with the estimated number of
persons with mental retardation executed.52
Jurors interviewed for the CJP are also asked, "How much did the
discussion among the jurors (at the penalty phase) focus on the fol-
lowing topics: defendant's IQ or intelligence?" 53 Because IQ is the
best-known indicator of mental retardation, this question taps into
how often jurors considered mental retardation an issue in their case.
Responses to this question show that jurors discuss defendants' intelli-
gence on a relatively routine basis. In particular, 14.2% of the 1,163
jurors who responded said that their penalty phase deliberations fo-
cused on the defendant's IQ or intelligence a "great deal." All told,
almost half of the jurors (46.3%) stated that the discussion at the pen-
alty phase of their trial focused on the defendant's IQ or intelligence
at least "a fair amount." Roughly one-quarter (25.5%) of jurors said
that their penalty phase deliberations focused on the defendant's IQ
or intelligence "not at all." Thus, it appears that jurors are more in-
clined to discuss the defendant's IQ or intelligence than they are to
describe the defendant as mentally retarded. Such a finding is consis-
tent with the diagnostic criteria for mental retardation. In addition to
subaverage intellectual functioning, the diagnosis requires concomi-
tant deficits in adaptive behavior and onset before eighteen years of
age.5
4
52. Keyes et al., supra note 49.
53. Capital cases must be tried as bifurcated proceedings. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153-54. In the
first phase, jurors are charged with determining whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. Id.
If the defendant is found guilty of the capital offense, there is at least one other phase at which
jurors must decide the appropriate penalty; this is known as the penalty phase. See id. It is
during this phase that jurors are presented with aggravating factors-those that suggest that
death is a more appropriate penalty-and mitigating factors-those that suggest that a sentence
of life is a more appropriate penalty. Id. at 154.
54. The Am. Ass'n on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, Definition of Mental Retar-
dation, http://www.aamr.orglPolicies/faq-mental-retardation.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2008).
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B. Mental Retardation and Case Outcomes
Interestingly, of the fifty-seven jurors who said the term "mentally
retarded" described the defendant "very well," 61.4% served on juries
that sentenced the defendant to life in prison.5 5 Given that, 41.2% of
the sample as a whole served on life cases, it appears that the defen-
dant's mental retardation exerts a powerful mitigating influence on a
small group of capital jurors. It is tempting to ask whether there is
something unique about those trials where jurors viewed the defen-
dant as mentally retarded that could account for the disparity in case
outcomes. That question, however, assumes that classifying cases by
whether the defendant is mentally retarded is as easy as classifying
cases by whether the defendant is a juvenile.5 6 To determine whether
a defendant is ineligible for the death penalty based on age, one
merely subtracts the year of birth from the year of the crime. While
there are certainly situations where birth certificates cannot be lo-
cated, there can be little argument concerning eligibility based on age
when the year of birth is known.
No comparable formula exists for determining whether a defendant
is mentally retarded. It is not surprising that jurors who serve on the
same jury do not necessarily agree on the defendant's mental status.
The extent to which there is lack of consensus is demonstrated by the
CJP's finding that the fifty-seven jurors who viewed the defendant as
mentally retarded served on forty-seven different juries. Given that
an average of three to four jurors were interviewed from each trial
included in the CJP, 57 the difficulty in convincing an entire jury that a
defendant is mentally retarded becomes abundantly clear. To the ex-
tent that the defendant's mental retardation was the reason to vote for
life, these data suggest that this was a decision made-initially at
least-by individual jurors. Furthermore, these data make it clear
that classifying cases by whether the defendant was mentally retarded
is inappropriate. The more appropriate analysis focuses on individual
jurors.
In an attempt to understand how a variety of factors affect decision
making, jurors were asked a series of questions about each factor, in-
55. In contrast, of the 749 jurors who said the term "mentally retarded" described the defen-
dant "not at all," 41% served on juries that sentenced the defendant to life in prison.
56. See William J. Bowers et al., Too Young for the Death Penalty: An Empirical Examination
of Community Conscience and the Juvenile Death Penalty from the Perspective of Capital Jurors,
84 B.U. L. REv. 609, 687 (2004) (comparing cases where the defendant was a juvenile at the time
of the crime to cases where the defendant was an adult and finding that "[j]uvenile status is far
more likely than mental retardation to keep capital jurors from sentencing a defendant to
death"). See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
57. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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cluding whether the defendant was mentally retarded. First, the jurors
were asked whether a situation or circumstance-for instance, that the
defendant was mentally retarded-was a factor in their case. Next, if
the person indicated that the situation or circumstance was a factor in
their case, they were asked to indicate the importance of that factor in
their sentencing decision. Finally, the juror was asked if that situation
or circumstance made them much more likely, slightly more likely,
slightly less likely, much less likely, or just as likely to vote for a death
sentence. Conversely, if the juror stated that the situation or circum-
stance was not a factor in their case, they were asked, "In another
case, if that situation or circumstance was present, would that factor
make you much more likely, slightly more likely, slightly less likely,
much less likely, or just as likely to vote for death?" Thus, researchers
collected two different types of information about the influence of
mental retardation on sentencing outcomes: its actual impact on ju-
rors who believed that the defendant was mentally retarded and its
predicted or hypothetical influence on capital jurors who did not be-
lieve that the defendant was mentally retarded. Hence, all jurors were
explicitly asked either to describe how they evaluated the evidence of
the defendant's mental retardation in their case or to predict how they
would have treated evidence of mental retardation. The information
from this later group is akin to general public opinion polls with the
important distinction that all of the respondents in the CJP have
served as capital jurors.
All told, fifty-five jurors indicated that the defendant's mental retar-
dation was a factor in their case. These jurors were asked, "How im-
portant was this factor in your punishment decision?" Among the
jurors, 41.5% claimed that the defendant's mental retardation was
"very important" to their punishment decision. An additional 26.4%
said that the defendant's mental retardation was "fairly important" in
their punishment decision, and almost one in three (32.1%) said that
the defendant's mental retardation was "not important" in their pun-
ishment decision. The responses of both groups of jurors-those for
whom the defendant's mental retardation was a factor and those who
answered only hypothetically-to the respective follow-up questions
are presented below.
Table 1 illustrates that people believe they would be much more
sympathetic and receptive to evidence of mental retardation than they
actually are when presented with such evidence. For example, 80.7%
of jurors answering the hypothetical question believed that evidence
that the defendant was mentally retarded would make them at least
slightly less likely (31.4%), if not much less likely (49.3%), to vote for
[Vol. 57:679
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Table 1: Influence of Mental Retardation on Voting in the Case
Was the defendant's mental retardation a factor in your decision?
No, it was not
Yes, it was a a factor, but it
factor, and it would have
made me ... made me ...
% (#) % (#)
Much more likely to vote for death 2.3% (1) 0.7% (7)
Slightly more likely to vote for death 4.7% (2) 1.5% (15)
No more or no less likely to vote for death 41.9% (18) 17.0% (170)
Slightly less likely to vote for death 20.9% (9) 31.4% (314)
Much less likely to vote for death 30.2% (13) 49.3% (493)
Total: 100% (43) 99.9% (999)
a death sentence. In reality, just over half (51.1%) of the jurors who
believed that the defendant was mentally retarded stated that this fac-
tor made them less likely to vote for death. Many of the jurors for
whom the defendant's mental retardation was a factor in their case
(41.9%) stated that this information made them no more or less likely
to vote for death. Why is it that so many jurors who acknowledge that
the defendant in their case was mentally retarded nevertheless say
that this information made them no more or less likely to vote for
death? Stated differently, why is it that so many jurors, when actually
faced with evidence of mental retardation in their cases, fail to treat
that information as a mitigating factor justifying a sentence less than
death?
C. Mental Retardation as Related to Perceptions of Dangerousness
One reason that jurors frequently fail to treat evidence of mental
retardation as mitigation may be its relationship to perceptions of
dangerousness. To the extent that jurors believe that the defendant's
mental retardation reflects an inability to control one's behavior or a
tendency toward random violence, it is plausible that what should be
exceptionally strong mitigating evidence5 8 quickly becomes aggravat-
ing evidence.5 9
58. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989):
In this case, in the absence of instructions informing the jury that it could consider and
give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and abused back-
ground by declining to impose the death penalty, we conclude that the jury was not
provided with a vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral response' to that evidence in
rendering its sentencing decision ....
Id. at 303-04.
59. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
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Table 2 below shows that jurors who believed that the defendant
was mentally retarded were substantially more likely than those who
did not believe that the defendant was mentally retarded to say that
"dangerous to other people" described the defendant "very well." Al-
most three-fourths (70.9%) of the fifty-five jurors who claimed that
the defendant's mental retardation was a factor in their case said that
"dangerous to other people" described the defendant "very well." All
told, nine out of ten of the jurors who said that the defendant's mental
retardation in their case was a factor also stated that "dangerous to
other people" described the defendant at least "fairly well." While
jurors who did not believe that the defendant's mental retardation was
a factor in their case also believed that the defendant was dangerous
to others, they did so less extremely. For instance, there is a seven-
teen percentage point difference (from 70.9% to 53.7%) in terms of
"dangerousness to others" describing the defendant "very well" be-
tween jurors for whom the defendant's mental retardation was a fac-
tor and those for whom mental retardation was not a factor in their
case.
In brief, the data suggest that capital jurors are more likely to per-
ceive a mentally retarded defendant as dangerous to others than a
person who is not mentally retarded. Given the documented relation-
ship between perceptions of future dangerousness and case out-
comes, 60 the disparity between the anticipated and the actual
mitigating influence of mental retardation becomes more understand-
able. To the extent that jurors can come to understand the complex
characteristics of mental retardation-and particularly that danger-
ousness is not a characteristic feature of those so diagnosed 61-the
gap between the impact of mental retardation on sentencing outcomes
in the abstract and in practice should narrow. In an attempt to under-
stand more fully how jurors perceive defendants who are mentally re-
tarded, this Article turns to jurors' narrative accounts of their
experiences on these cases.
D. Jurors' Perceptions of Defendants with Mental Retardation
The CJP interviews utilized a variety of open-ended questions de-
signed to encourage respondents to describe in depth their capital trial
experiences, their reactions to the evidence, and the manner in which
they arrived at their punishment decisions. This Section focuses solely
on those interviews in which jurors indicated that the defendant's
60. See John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86
CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2001).
61. See Patton & Keyes, supra note 36, at 241 tbl.2.
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Table 2: Percentage of Jurors Who See Defendants as Dangerous by
Whether Mental Retardation Was a Factor in their Case
How well do the following describe the defendant?
Mental Retardation Was a Factor
Yes (#) No (#)
Dangerous to other people:
Very Well 70.9% (39) 53.7% (571)
Fairly Well 20.0% (11) 25.3% (269)
Not so Well 3.6% (2) 12.3% (131)
Not at All 5.5% (3) 8.7% (92)
Total: 100% (55) 100% (1,063)
mental retardation was a factor in their case. In reviewing the tran-
scripts of these interviews, several patterns become apparent. First,
jurors are confused by the terminology used to diagnose persons as
mentally retarded. Second, there is a disconnect between jurors' per-
ceptions of defendants' mental retardation and their actual capabili-
ties. Third, jurors' personal experiences inform their evaluations of
evidence of mental retardation. Fourth, jurors' perceptions of experts
who testify about defendants' mental capabilities vary. Finally, when
defendants with mental retardation were spared the death penalty,
their mental retardation was often part of a larger constellation of mit-
igating factors. This Section provides a more elaborate exploration of
each of these themes.
1. Confusion Regarding the Meaning of the Diagnosis
Even though mental retardation should be considered a mitigating
factor, it is not uncommon for jurors to express confusion about what
the diagnosis means or what they should do with the information.
This confusion is perhaps best illustrated by the response of a South
Carolina juror to the question, "Among the topics you did discuss
[during the guilt-innocence phase] what were the main areas or points
on which jurors disagreed?" The juror answered, "The line between
sane and mentally retarded or insane, or not sane because, the line
between, you know, being here and not being here, the line between
not being, how much competency you have, even if you are mentally
retarded." This juror was then asked if there was any information that
would have helped in making the punishment decision, and he re-
sponded that "no one knew what mental competence meant." Ac-
cording to this juror, there was a lack of understanding about how to
evaluate the evidence of mental retardation. That theme was echoed
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by a Kentucky juror, who said, "The defense tried to portray him as
semi-retarded ... [but the psychiatrists] also concluded that he knew
right from wrong, so, if he was retarded in any way, that wasn't a
factor as far as we were concerned." This juror basically dismissed the
potential mitigating influence of the defendant's "semi-retard[ation]"
and concluded that it was irrelevant after hearing testimony that the
defendant knew right from wrong.
Some jurors appear not to comprehend mental retardation diagno-
ses. For example, when describing the impression that the defendant
made, a Missouri juror said, "it wasn't for lack of education. It was
also because he was perhaps slow, suffering from some, some form of
retardation, or, ya know, hyperactive or something." Thus, for this
juror, the defendant could have been mentally retarded or perhaps
hyperactive. Similarly, when asked how well "mentally retarded" de-
scribed the defendant, another South Carolina juror responded, "Well
they tried to bring that out in court but I don't think he was retarded
enough to do something like that. He might not have had good sense,
but I couldn't place him as just mental." It thus appears that, for this
juror, the defendant was not "retarded enough" for it to have contrib-
uted to his behavior. This juror's response suggests a failure to distin-
guish between what was likely mild mental retardation and lack of
"good sense."
Another way in which juror misunderstanding about the mental re-
tardation diagnosis was revealed in the interviews is through jurors'
references to the defendants' inappropriate behaviors during the trial.
As previously discussed, mild retardation is often characterized by a
"cloak of competence" and may be revealed through "a behavior
(e.g., smiling or laughing) that suggests a lack of remorse (e.g., happi-
ness) at an inappropriate time (e.g., during trial). '62 That description
could have been written about one defendant in a North Carolina
case. When asked if there "is anything about the case that continues
to stick in mind or that you keep thinking about," the juror re-
sponded, "[The defendant] was laughing when [the jury] handed down
[the] sentence. When that happened, hair stood up on the back of my
neck, and I knew the man just wasn't right."
The above quotations illustrate a pattern of misunderstanding re-
garding the meaning of mental retardation. Echoing the findings of
past research, 63 these data suggest that capital jurors are unable to
distinguish among various levels of mental retardation and that they
62. See Patton & Keyes, supra note 36.
63. See id.
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confuse the task of evaluating evidence of mild mental retardation as
a mitigator (a penalty phase consideration) with the standard neces-
sary to determine sanity (a guilt-phase defense). Furthermore, CJP
data suggest that jurors reconcile their confusion by erring on the side
of skepticism, with the result being disbelief that the defendant is
mentally retarded.
2. The Disconnect between Diagnosis and Perceived Abilities
For several jurors, there was an apparent disconnect between a di-
agnosis of mental retardation and their perceptions of the defendant's
abilities. For some jurors, that disconnect was tied directly to the de-
fendant's actions during the crime. For example, one juror explained,
"If [the defendant is] retarded and didn't know what he's doing then
why did he drag her around behind the church before he did any-
thing? ... [H]e was mentally competent enough to hide his acts."
Likewise, an Indiana juror said that, "the fact he tried to cover it up-
it showed some rationale" was an important factor in making the pun-
ishment decision. Similarly, a Kentucky juror stated the following:
[T]he evidence started pointing to me that this was a pretty cold-
blooded crime that could have been avoided on more than one oc-
casion. He had plenty of time to think about walking down that
road, to turn around and come back. And he didn't. He chose. He
made a conscious decision not to avoid the confrontation.
For other jurors, it was not anything about the crime per se, but rather
the defendant's actions either in jail or during trial. A juror from
South Carolina explained as follows:
The only thing that I really focused on-the idea of him writing all
those letters to his girlfriend when he was in jail. You know, using
those words, that I'm a teacher, and I couldn't write anything like
that. That man was smart. He knew what he was doing.
Similarly, a juror from Alabama recalled that the "[d]efense said de-
fendant was mentally defective but defendant spoke well trying to
save his skin."
Perhaps more than any other reaction, the jurors reported disbelief
about the actual diagnosis. This characterization is different than con-
fusion about the diagnosis in that jurors thought the defendant was
attempting to fool everyone. In such cases, the jurors appeared to rely
upon their beliefs that the defendants knew right from wrong and,
thus, whatever disabilities existed, they were not severe enough to jus-
tify reducing defendants' punishment:
" "He acted crazy for the test."
" "We were also shown a videotape of him when he was arrested,
things that he said on there. I don't know if it's incompetence, it's
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a slickness-whatever you want to call it-just outsmart you, the
lying."
" "If you followed the whole trial, you found [defendant] to be a
good actor."
" "He tried to come off as a guy with so many problems; a show."
" "I think that during his testimony, there were times when he ap-
peared to be kind of a cunning individual, and not one that is an
individual that can't understand right and wrong. He knew per-
fectly well what he was doing."
Therefore, for these jurors, allegations of mental retardation were just
another way that defendants try to avoid responsibility for their ac-
tions. Moreover, defendants were seen as malingering, putting on "a
show," and, by implication, attempting to mislead the jury. If the de-
fendants were truly mentally retarded, the reasoning goes, they would
not have engaged in a particular behavior or have been capable of
communicating as effectively. Unlike jurors who failed to understand
what mental retardation is and how it differs from an insanity defense,
these jurors did not believe that the defendant's intellectual disabili-
ties were severe enough to warrant consideration as mitigation.
3. Jurors' Personal Experiences
Another common theme that emerged from the interviews is the
extent to which jurors rely upon their own and other jurors' exper-
iences to interpret defendants' behaviors. For example, an Alabama
juror who served on a life case noted the importance of teachers on
the jury: "We had teacher[s] in there that were familiar with teaching
the mentally deficient. We had teacher[s] in there who would teach
the children from that environmental and family background. They
presented their views. Everybody presented their views, and the re-
sult was life in prison." A juror from South Carolina, herself a
teacher, was nonplussed by the defendant's low IQ score:
Some of the tests he had taken and he had scored low, and then as a
teacher I know that IQs can be raise[d]. For an example, there was
a question on one of the tests. One of the brightest students missed
it, because they asked her if she was going to her grandma's, what
would her mom pack her things in? And they have a cardboard box
and a suitcase. Well, she was supposed to say the suitcase, but her
mom always put her things in a cardboard box .... If he could have
done all those things that he did . . . he was not mentally unbal-
anced. His IQ was so low, but IQs can be raised.
For another South Carolina juror, the case reminded her of her work
with mentally retarded children during the summers of her college
years: "Connecting the two together, mental retardation and the chil-
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dren, I couldn't separate the two, and I figured that it wasn't his fault,
that's why I decided on the life sentence. I was trying to get every-
body else to see that."
For a Kentucky juror, personal experience was irrelevant to the sen-
tencing determination. Rather, this juror reported comparing the de-
fendant's situation to unknown others that could have been in the
same situation:
I didn't imagine myself being in his situation, but I often thought
about people that have experienced different homes, different peo-
ple to care for them. In point of fact, there are a lot of people who
wind up in those categories, and not all of them wind up killing
people.
Jurors appear to be looking for ways in which to interpret the defen-
dant's mental status by comparing him to others. By relying upon
one's own personal experience or that of other jurors, the defendant's
sentence may be a function of how well the defendant compares to
those (un)known others. For some, the defendant's limitations are
less profound and, thus, are dismissed as a potential mitigator. In con-
trast, some defendants may remind jurors of others who are intellectu-
ally or developmentally disabled in a way that elicits more sympathy.
4. Perceptions of Experts
Evidence of intellectual disability is often introduced through ex-
pert testimony, so it is not surprising that the jurors' perceptions of
experts affect whether they believe the defendant is mentally re-
tarded.64 For example, several jurors noted that dueling experts can-
celed each other out: "One doctor said [the defendant] was insane 65
and the other said he was not. Basically the decision came from us."
A Missouri juror was not persuaded by the mental health expert's tes-
timony, claiming that the jury "tuned [her] out." In describing the
testimony, this juror said that the "psychologist-or psy, I don't re-
member what she was-she got too technical and too long, and to-
ward the end, none of us, we didn't even wait to hear her." A similar
inability to relate to an expert witness was reflected in the statements
of a North Carolina juror when asked if any of the "testimony by de-
fense witnesses at the punishment stage of the trial backfired or actu-
64. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive
Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1997) (finding that defense strategies that rely
on primarily expert testimony are likely to fail while those that orchestrate the consistent presen-
tation of evidence by experts, lay witnesses, and even family members are more likely to
succeed).
65. Even though this juror referred to the issue in terms of sanity, other jurors on this case
talk about the defendant's IQ being in the high 70s.
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ally hurt their case?" The juror replied, "Psychologist. He was, for a
professional witness, unprepared, did not do his job very well ...
made a lot of quotes out of a book that I personally had nothing to
relate them to." Another juror from this case felt similarly about the
psychologist: "A lot of our decision rested on that person; did not
prove that [the defendant] had mental disease and was on drugs."
Thus, some jurors disregarded the testimony of dueling experts. For
other jurors, the perceived poor performance on the part of the expert
may allow them to dismiss other evidence of the defendant's intellec-
tual dysfunction.
5. Constellation of Factors
Thus far, jurors' comments have spoken to specific aspects of the
evidence or testimony concerning the defendants' intellectual disabili-
ties. It appears that jurors who served on cases where mental retarda-
tion was a factor were confused about what the diagnosis meant and
how they should evaluate the related evidence. In many situations,
jurors' expectations about mental retardation were inconsistent
with-and usually more extreme than-the perceived functioning of
the defendant. In other cases, jurors were skeptical of evidence of
mental retardation and believed defendants were malingering. In
general, the jurors appeared to trust their own experience and that of
their fellow jurors more than the experts. Given these difficulties, in
which cases do jurors point to the defendant's mental retardation as
the reason for voting for life?
A review of the CJP's interviews lends credence to Scott Sundby's
finding that the cases most likely to result in a life sentence are those
that are well orchestrated and use testimony from multiple witnesses
about the defendant's condition.66 While jurors often mentioned de-
fendants' intellectual disabilities, the most compelling stories for life
sentences usually went beyond that aspect to talk about a constella-
tion of mitigating circumstances. A case from Florida provides an ex-
ample of the way in which stories of mitigation can become stories for
life. When asked what the defense attorney stressed most as the rea-
son the defendant should not get the death penalty, one of the jurors
said, "he had an IQ of 57. That's what stands out in my mind." This
juror then went on to describe the evidence for the defense at the
penalty phase. When asked whether the defense's mitigation wit-
nesses included a variety of people, this juror stated the following:
66. See Sundby, supra note 64.
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A preacher, several (co-workers), his mother, and aunt. His aunt
testified he had been hit in the head several times when he was
young. One time he was hit with a pipe when the kids were playing,
another time with a brick. The kid had a rough life. I'm not deny-
ing that, but, my gosh, this whole situation. If you've never been
there, you can't imagine what it was like. It got to the point when
the family was going up-the friends and the clergy pleading for
this young man's life-it was almost like a carnival. Who can tell a
story that's more incredible? And then comes the next witness, it
was unbelievable.
This was also a case in which the expert witness, a psychologist,
made a positive impression on the jurors:
The psychological expert had formulated a test for measuring IQ
and criminal, a capacity-type test for committing crimes. He had
put all of this on a graph. He had done hundreds of interviews with
criminals and had a baseline for comparison. [The defendant] was
either at or below all of the scales. It was so incredible to have an
expert witness up there who had hundreds of interviews with
criminals and has been able to develop this type of test . . . that
really clinched it for me.
The jurors on this particular case were so persuaded by the mitigating
evidence that they were angry at the defense attorneys for not bring-
ing it forward in the guilt phase. When asked if there was anything
about the case that stuck in their minds, another juror on this case
said, "Yes. After we brought the verdict in they bring witnesses to
make you feel that you did something wrong. I felt that should have
been done before the jury went in for the verdict because really, basi-
cally, I think the sentence would have been different."
Another juror's response to that question echoed the same theme:
Yes, we were led down the road that [the defendant] was an individ-
ual who was a bad person who got in a lot of trouble and basically
was not to be put back out on the street in the public. Yet there was
information that was withheld from us, that was held until sentenc-
ing, info about severe injuries he received as a child, info pertaining
to his IQ, extremely low IQ. These are factors I feel should have
been brought out in the defense portion of the case which probably
would have steered us to a different verdict. Had we known all
these facts from the beginning, as opposed to trying to punish him,
we would have sent him to a hospital for treatment.
That juror went on to blame the defense attorneys for not bringing
forward mitigation in the guilt phase of the trial:
The first thing we discussed [during the penalty phase deliberations]
was how in the world can these two men call themselves defense
attorneys for not bringing out this information earlier. We dis-
cussed how in the world could the judge, upon all of this informa-
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tion coming out, not penalize them in some way for not
representing him properly.
The defendant in this case was sentenced to life in prison, but the
juror's remarks show a misunderstanding of the structural constraints
on the defense during the guilt phase of the trial.67
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Atkins dissents, written by then Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, take issue with the lack of information available on how
actual sentencing juries treat evidence of mental retardation. 68 Justice
Scalia in particular chided the majority for assuming that juries cannot
"account properly for the 'diminished capacities' of the retarded. ' 69
Using data collected by the CJP, this Article directly addresses these
concerns by examining actual jurors' perceptions of mental retarda-
tion and the role these perceptions played in their sentencing
decisions.
There is reason to suspect that evidence of mental retardation ex-
erts a powerful mitigating influence on some capital jurors. Empirical
studies reveal strong public opposition to the execution of capital of-
fenders with mental retardation, 70 and jurors in our study who be-
lieved that the defendant in their case was not mentally retarded
indicated that evidence of mental retardation would make them less
likely to vote for death. However, there was a lack of consensus
among jurors about which defendants were in fact was mentally re-
tarded. As discussed, the fifty-seven jurors who indicated that men-
tally retarded described the defendant in their case "very well" served
on forty-seven different juries. If jurors agreed on the qualities indica-
tive of mental retardation, more jurors from each case would have
stated that the defendant was mentally retarded. Hence, although
general opposition to a death sentence for capital offenders who are
mentally retarded is firmly established, this opposition appears to be
based on stereotypes that conflict with the realities of mild retarda-
67. See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and
the Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1997). See also CRAIG HANEY,
DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM (2005) (find-
ing that the process of death sentencing includes psychological factors that serve to make death
verdicts more likely).
68. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("In reaching its
conclusion today, the Court does not take notice of the fact that neither petitioner nor his amici
have adduced any comprehensive statistics that would conclusively prove (or disprove) whether
juries routinely consider death a disproportionate punishment for mentally retarded offenders
like petitioner.").
69. id. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
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tion, the type of mental retardation jurors are most likely to be
presented with at trial. How, then, do jurors reconcile this inconsis-
tency? One way that jurors can maintain a sense of consistency is to
refuse to believe that the defendant is mentally retarded. By so doing,
jurors can vote for death while maintaining that they are opposed to
the death penalty for persons who are mentally retarded-it is just
that the defendant in their case was not mentally retarded.
Further, there is a tendency for jurors who see the defendant as
mentally retarded to vote for a life sentence, but this is not always the
case. Cases that resulted in life sentences usually involved a compel-
ling constellation of mitigating evidence. Thus, a mere diagnosis of
mental retardation is insufficient to result in a sentence of life.71
Rather, jurors look to understand how the defendant's mental retar-
dation manifested itself in other aspects of the person's life and how
the overall story of the defendant's life suggests that life in prison, not
death, is the more appropriate sentence.
Our findings demonstrate that jurors often confuse mental retarda-
tion with other conditions, including mental illness, and that much of
the related evidence is interpreted in terms of sanity, not mitigation.
If jurors do not understand the important distinctions between the
meanings of these terms, they cannot properly evaluate and interpret
the evidence in accordance with the law. While some jurors acknowl-
edge their confusion, the greater tendency is to rely upon experience
as the basis for interpretation. This means that not all jurors will con-
sider mental retardation mitigating.
When asking whether jurors are equipped to take account of the
"diminished capacities of the retarded," 72 the answer is that, given the
current structure of capital sentencing procedures, it depends on the
individual juror. While the law is clear that mental retardation is a
mitigating factor, CJP data suggest that many jurors' beliefs regarding
mental retardation conflict with the legal standard. 73 Thus, before we
can assume that jurors are equipped to account properly for the di-
minished capacities of persons with mental retardation, more needs to
be done to both understand jurors' beliefs and to educate them about
the law. As to the former, attorneys should be given broad latitude
during voir dire to question jurors about both their understanding of
and experience with individuals with mental retardation. If a prospec-
71. Jurors appear not to understand or believe a diagnosis of mental retardation without com-
pelling testimony on the ways in which the defendant's intellectual disabilities were manifested
beyond the specific crime.
72. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 304 (majority opinion).
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tive juror's beliefs regarding mental retardation are limited to severe
cases, that person may be mitigation-impaired and thus ineligible to
serve as a juror.7 4 Likewise, determining only whether a prospective
juror has experience with individuals with mental retardation is insuf-
ficient. Attorneys must attempt to understand the nature of jurors'
experiences with individuals with mental retardation to ensure that
they will be able to properly consider the evidence as mitigation.
Doubtless, some jurors are capable of taking proper account of a de-
fendant's diminished capacities, but determining who they are re-
quires expansive voir dire on related issues.
74. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
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